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Abstract
Looking back around half a century, Thailand has been one of the fastest growing
economies  in the world. lt also possesses an impressive  record in term of poverfy  reduction'
Whether the two phenomena are related  and, if so, how, are of great interest to academic and
policymakers.  This paper attempts to shed some light on this issue, by first trying to provide
descriptive explanation  of what caused economic  growth in the past 50 year-s, separated into five
sub-periods,  and then quantirativeiy calculates how'much gtowth'contributed  tb the reducfron of
poverty since 1986. We argue that the impressive growth rates could be attributed  to the
countryi5 high and rising openness.  sound macroeconomic  management emphasizing  stability in
both fiscal and monetary policies,  promotion of market meehanism and private sector'
strcngthening of key public policy agencies, and appropriate.mix of quantity and quality of
human resources.  There were some disruptions in the growth process, most notably during late
1970s up to early 1980s, and the 1997 hnancial crisis. The disruptions were caused both by
cxternal factors, such as world recessions, effective  appreciation of local culrency  under fxed
exchange rate, and by domestic factors such as failure to timely adjust exchange rate system, lack
ofgood goverrance in both public policy and private businesses.
I-his lraper is an gpdated arrtl extended  version of another  paper by the same author, "Thailand's Economic Growth:
A Filiy-Years  Pcrspective (1950-2000)."  subrnitted to the Global Development  Network  for the Global Research
I'}ro ject "Explrining Cirowth"  in 2001.
I{esearclr I)irt:t'tor (Macrocconornic  Developnrent and lncome Distribution), the Thailand Development  Research






















The second part of the paper is the analysis of pro-poorness of overall economic growth
and the irnportance of incolne sources in reducing poverty. Applying Kakwani et.al (2004),s
methodology to Thai household data during 1986-2002, it is found that, before the crisis,
econotnic growth helped poor more than proportionately  since around 1992, when compared to
the succeeding  period of 1986-1992. After the crisis, the growth was unfavorable to the Thai
poor only in 1999. Using household survey in 2000, the poverty elasticify is calculated  at-1.206,
meaning that for every I percent increase in average per capita income,  poverty would reduce by
l'206 percent' As for the importance of income sourccs in poverty reduction, the poverty
elasticity indicates  in-kind income, while the poverty reform index indicates  rural non-form
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Looking back around half a century, Thailand is among one of the fast growing
economies  in the world. It also possesses an impressive  record in term of poverty reduction.
Whether the two phenomena  are related,  and if so, how, are of great interest to academic and
policymakers.  Numerous researches have demonstrated  that growth is good for poverty
reduction. The more relevant question  is how much is growth good for poverty reduction. The
recent literature thus focuses on the issue of pro-poor  growth.
This paper attempts  to shed some light on this issue for the case of Thailand.  The first
section describes the country's growth experience, in which the overall picture of growth and
growth accounting  are presented. It then proceeds with the factors that are potentially  capable of
explaining episodes of growth in the past fifty years. For each growth episode, attention will be
paid to the major changes in environment  and policies that are likely to affect growth
performance.  Specifically, four categories of factors that pose defining  influences  are considered.
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and policies,  and (d) microeconomic  or institutional  environment  and policies.  Section 2 then
presents  the results of the estimates of pro-poor growth for Thailand during 1986-2002.
l. Growth Experiences
The purpose of this section is to provide detailed accounts in the past fifty years, from
1952-2005, of changes in policies and environments  in Thailand that are potentially  crucial to the
understanding  of the growth process. It will do so by dividing Thai economic history into four
sub-periods, namely,
l) 1952-1973:  a period that Thailand laid foundations for the subsequent  high and stable
economic  growth.
II)  1974-1985: a period of macroeconomic uncertainty, hardship and difficult
adiustrnents.
III) 1986-1996:  the decade of extraordinary  high growth.
IV) 1997-2000:  economic  crisis.
V) 2001-present:  a period of steady recovery to the normal time.
Cverall, Thailand can be regarded as one of the fastest growing economies among
developing countries.  The average  annual growth rate between 1952 and 2005 is a respectable  6.3
percent. Figure I shows the yearly growth rate since 1952.
Of course, high growth rates were not achieved year in year out, and were not identical
between sector of production. Table 1 summarizes  the economic growths of Thailand, divided
into four sub-periods, and by major economic sectors (agriculture,  industry,  manufacturing, and
servrce).
The sub-period  III (1986-1996) is clearly the time Thailand enjoyed its highest economic
growths,  averaging 9.2 percent per annum. These high growths were led by the growths in
rnannlhcturing  sector. It also is the most stable period, having the coefficient of variation of72
growth rates of only 0.26 (see also Table l). On the other hand, the sub-period IV (1997-2000)  is
no doubt the most difficult time in Thai economic  history, growing on average of -0.7 percent
with bulging  standard deviation of 7.1 percent, amounting to a -10 coefficient of variation.
Thailand has quickly turned from its most prosperous  time into the most difficult  one.
The reverse, but to a much lesser degree, can be said about the growth path within the
sub-period  I (1952-1973). The early part ofthis period (1952-1953)  saw a relatively low growth
(4.6 percent)  with high variation (0.97 coeffrcient of variation), which were in contrast with the







































Table I  Thailand's  Growth Structure 1952-2005 (percentages)






































































































































































































































Figure I Annual GDP Gmrvth Rates (1952-2005)
Source:  National  Economic  and Social Development Board (NESDB).
Note: Dotted lines indicate the average growth level for each sub-period.
l.l  Growth Accounting
Table 2 and Figure 2 show growth accounting for the period 198l-1995. The overall
growths  are decomposed into those contributed  by increases in input uses and that by increases  in
total factor productivity or TFP.
As in most studies of growth accounting of East Asian (and also countries in other
regions);  capital accumulation accounted for the lion share of growth contributions, rising to as
high as about 80% during l99l-1995.
The contributions from labor were rapidly superseded by the increases in quality.
Standing  at only 4.4 percent contribution  during 1981-19851  the labor quality increased to 8.2
percent during 1986-1990.  It further increased  to 16.7 percent during 1991-1995, well surpassing
the contribution  from the increase  in labor alone (4.8 percent).
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The growth of TFP was more pronounced  during 1986-1990,  and was almosr negligible
in the subsequent  period of l99l-1995.
Table 2 Sources of Growth  by Sectors,  l981-1995 (percentages)
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1.2 Explaining  Growths
This section explains factors that are most likely capable of explaining  growths in each
sub-period.  As mentioned earlier, the explaining  factors are classified into political' external'
macroeconomic  environments and policies, and microeconomic and institutional  factors' Table 3
to 6 maps out the timeframe when these factors took place and how long they lasted'
I) 1950-1973:  A period of Institutionalization  leading to High and stable Growth
Microeconomic Management, Politics and Institutions
In 1950, Thai economy found itself in the state of recovering from damages left over
lrom the Second World War.
The economic management during the most part of the 1950s decade  was probably best
described  as eccentrically  diverse, trying to serve many goals that did not seem to add up' The
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subsidize urban population  via unfavorable  rate for rice export, which suppressed  domestic price
oi'rice.
Thc nationalism that arose after the triumph of the communists  in China in 1949 had also
played a significant  role, The military government at the time put forward the anti-Chinese
policies that limited the chinese entrepreneurs  from doing various 'key' businesses. In these
businesses, the government set up many public or quasi-public enterprises that enjoyed monopoly
rights2. The Chinese commercial communities  adapted to the situation by forming business
alliances with military top men. These alliances laid the foundation for business-bureaucrat
relationship  that exists throughout  Thailand's economic  development  history.
'fhc economic mismanagement  and the repression against Chinese businesses  resulted in
poor rnacroeconomic performance. The GDp grew only at 3.g percent per annum durine lg5 l_
I 958.
The turbulence prevailing  in 1950s was put to an end in 1958, when Field Marshall Sarit
Thanarat took complete control of the power through a coup d'etat. Sarit brought with his
premiership a vision to run the country according to the international standard, comprehensively
prescribed in a World Bank report (IBRD, 1959)3. He also presided over a period of rapid
institutionalization  of various public units that proved to be vital to the later economic
development.  Two new units were established, the Budget Bureau (1959) and the Fiscal policy
office (1961)' and one revamped,  the National Economic  Development Board (t959)4.  These
three units and the Bank of rhailand jointly determined  the annual budget, which in those days
gave high priorities to development  projects,  primarily infrastructure constructions.  The soal and
- The settirrg Lrp ol'monopoly entities  was a means that military used to acquire wealth,  which was lost substantially
bccause of'tlrc hyper-intlation after the War.
1 - The influcncc cf'the world Bank did not begin with the 1959 report. In fact, Thailand  was the first country  in East
Asia that borrowed  from the world Bank (Faculty of Economics, Thammasat Unrversity, 1996, page 3g). The 1959
rcport ilsell'was also a result of a world Bank mission that carne to Thailand  before sarit,s time. what sarit did was
lrutting  tlrc schcme  into action.
4









to add uP' The
:rnment and to78
lltcarrs of economic development engineered by Sarit government  were offrcially  declared  in the
country's first National Economic and Social Development  plan.
Business  activities were also enhanced by the policy shift toward a more invesrment-
friendly to domestic private and foreign investors.
The role of military-founded monopolies was greatly diminished  and a comprehensive
investment promotion  policy was launched with the pass of the new Industrial Invesrment
Promotion  Act in 1959' Compared to the previous  act, this law gave more genuine projections to
investors and numerous domestic  and foreign firms sprung up to take up these protective benefits.
Despite the more favorable atmosphere, the commercial sector and investment demand
were not the major contributors to the high economic expansion, which recorded  atT.2percent
per annum between 1958 and 1973.lt was the agriculture sector that proved to be the primary
engine of growth for the period. Helped by the government expenditure on road buildine. the
farmers rapidly opened up land further away from rivers and railway lines, which they had been
using for transporting their products to the markets before the road network was builtS. Equally
tmportant was the building of large-scale inigation  system that facilitated the dry season
cultivation  of rice, most notably in the central region,
The dynamics  of agricultural production in this period is perhaps a good example of how
economic growth in Thailand  has been driven by increasing  uses of inputs instead of advancing
technology.  When corrected  for land expansion and irrigation provision,  one would find that there
was no real gain in production yields.6
Linkages between  growths in agricultural sector and the industrial sector are worth
noting' Agriculture growths were driven mainly by accelerated export demand. The foreign and
government  revenue  derived from the expansion in agricultural  export and production  in 1960s
'The clearing ot the forests,  promoted by the government's giving our concessions,  also explains the rapid expansion  of
agricultural  land.
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providcd  necessary  rcsources for early industrialization  that was primarily aimed at substituting
ir.nports.
In sunlmary, the key to success of Thailand's  early modem economic development  owed
rnuch to the combination  of (a) a vision to promote economic growth through macroeconomic
management,  favorable  business  environment,  and institutional strengthening, and (b) a strong
sense of fiscal discipline.  The fiscal discipline, exhibited mainly by the curb on public debt
crcation, was an indispcnsable ingredient to the unintemrpted  process of high and stable
economic  growth during one and a half decades that followed. In this regard, Thailand was lucky
to be able to build such vital fiscal discipline under the comrpt military rulings.
II) 1974-1985:  Political Uncertainty and Economic  Turbulence
Quite coincidentally, the economic and political  stability Thailand  could be said to end
on tlie very same week in October 1973. Domestically, the military Thanom govemment
resigned arnidst the rnassive protestation from the general public and, internationally,  the six-day
war broke out in the Middle East, which marked  the beginning of the first oil shock. The outburst
of political freedom,  Iong suppressed  under the military power, was unfortunately  coincided with
the triumph of communists in Indo-chines neighbors. The fear of the so-called'domino  theory',
that Thailand would soon follow suit to be taken over by the communism movement, led to one
of the most vigorous confrontations in Thai history, most notably between the lefts and the rights,
The confrontation ended tragically in 1976, when the right-wing military once again took over the
power.
However it ended, the seed of political  awareness  following the 1973 uprising  has
permanent implications  on Thailand's  economic  and policy arena. All the governments  since then
could not, as they had been able to before, be totally ignorant to the needs ofpeople, even during
the right-wing political suppression of 1976-1979. One of the consequences of this development
was the soaring government budget deficit, arising from the increased government expenditure,
which eventually led to the serious public debt problem during the hrst half of 1980s.80
Not only was the increasing government expenditure explained by the changing political
structurc,  but also by the need for the govemment to counter the economic  slumps that followed
the two sharp oil price hikes (the first and the second oil shocks) and the world recession of early
1980s. The difficulties associated with the two oil shocks were however different  in magnitude.
Helped by the commodity prices boom during 1972-1974 during the first oil crisis, Thailand  was
not as fortunate when the second oil crisis hit in 1979-1980, as the mounting problem of budget


















O  IF  X tr  L-Y
a liat  !? E .9,? " f  dt.v o  o;r
'a  i-"---





































































































































































































































































---t*--*i  -  i
i  16:
















-'*l*-*-i  .F i-"
,.  !.-  I  I  i
o  iij  i 2i
tri,Fxi Ei

























































:  i  i  ,r^
::,i><=






: >i  i
io;  :
!v:  i loi  l
......i o,.-...;  ...
:dt  I
i!::i ttil




i't  i  :  i
.a  i






iai iiii ,a\:  :  i  i  l
E;iril o:  t-l  :i yti.=i  il c6i  iai  !  : 9;  :<r  i  i
,::-i  !:
ri  ld:  I  i
i:  ;ut  ,: l-l
'  ii;  ini !  |  : 
= 
i'-  -:  Y  f-''--- O:el bo  ,ai  i'E: Ct:^i  ,O-
9:  i!  i  i-:
6:r/1  .:-i :-:
c:  e:  oii 9r  :oi  :>i
F  !  ^l
F.,;  Lo  :,-.-i  i  -
=t 
:91 ;  i  i
iji  ,6:  ,  ',3
a'..!-l::.=
oi  i  I  i  i-
9i  i  i  I  i: tr  j  i  i  i  td




'.  ;  i  :  :J r:i;:






lil!l ;irO:  I
i  |  :-o;  I
:  !  |)t  i i6,
|  :  i  ^i 
I :  :  tq)  |
ta:
!6il
:;l  :  :




:  i  O:  i  i.- :,  ,..n  : z
|  .  ;  i= .t
!i
!  i  :  I  ie i  i  i  :  iq-
li
i:
h  :  :  :  .E .:  i  i  i  :N




o  i  !  !  |  i!
>i  !  !  '  i:
€  i  i  :  ;.t > I  :  I  :  iv
i:il t::l





---i-*-- i  i.-* |
:::l
mi  !il
m:  Xi  I
eii{t  I o-:  I a  ,6i  I
--i--  : -;-  I
i  :co:  I '  ia:  I
.ol
I I  t;l  I l:o!  I ----..i "..---i  o  .----l
ii*,1
!  !-\.i  I iioi  I 'A:  I ;!E:  I
i  taa  I ii:l ;iil i:il






-**l  6  i  r--*l
i.oi  !  | i()i  il ie:il
16l  il
i6iil
:C)i  i  I
!d!  !l
ioi  !l











C  i  i  !  :o  i
rr  !
|  :  i  :k  I
!iitd6i
i  i  i  :r,.i liiir3; iitiz.  l
ii:!i
:I i-*-i----1-*-r-*t
i  io'oi  I  i
i  ;cd,.:!  ;  I
i  i.=-i  :  I r  io  b0  :  i
I  lfi'-  :  : i  :x6i  .  i
i  ;-ol  !  ;





































































































































































The economic hardship caused changes in politics. In 1980, General  Prem Tinnasulanon
took the of fice of Thailand's premiership, where he stayed for the next eight years. His term is
considered  one of the most stable political in Thai history, in spite of a number of coup de'tat
attempts.  This is a remarkable achievement.  considering the rapidly changing  economic
conditions  during the period. On economic achievements,  his governments managed  to restore
fiscaldiscipline during 1982 to 1985.
Thai economy was also greatly affected by the rapid movements in some of the world
major currencies, an experience  the country had not been prepared to deal with before. After the
collapse of the Bretton-Wood system, Thailand chose to continue pegging its currency with the
U'S' dollar. This decision proved to be costly when the U.S. currency appreciated against other
major currencies between 1978 and 1985. As a result, the Thai baht was therefore de factor
appreciated,  which contaminated the country's competitiveness.  Thai government was forced to
devalue the currency by 15% in 1981, and went on to abandon the single-currency fixed exchange
rate to the basket system in 1984, which amounted  to an effective devaluation against the U.S.
dollar by another l5o%.
This sub-period also witnessed a major structural change in production. Agriculture
sector, which expanded rapidly in 1960s into the late 1970s, now faced with two major obstacles
to further growths: the declining world prices since 1980 and the rapidly dwindling of forest areas
suitable for agricultural production, The average agricultural growth during 1974-19g5 was a
mere 3'80% compared to 6.0Yo duiing 1959-1973.  In the meantime, the attempt to shift the
country's industrial policy from import-substitution  to export-promotion  began to gain
momenturn.  The hallmark of this policy shift was the enactment of the 1977 Investment
Prornotion Act. However, the success of the new industrial policy was limited by at least three
factors, namely,
(a) the unfavorable world economy  at the time,
(b) the over-valuation ofthe baht during lggl-19g4, and










One of the symptoms of the economic difficulties  manifested itself in the crises of the
financial instirutions. Between 1979 and 1986, there were episodes of financial institution
problems spreading all over the period. But generally  speaking, the problems can be clustered into
two separate waves, those beginning in 1979 and those beginning in 1983. The second wave was
tnore serious than the frrst, with the closures of 20 finance companies  and one commercial bank,
and 25 finance and companies  and 2 commercial banks were put under rescue package from the
central bankT
Thailand during this sub-period was thus facing an unprecedented  rise in both political
and economic uncertainties. Economic hardship was felt most in the latter part of this sub-period
(1979-1985), where the windfalls from commodi,ty price boom in 1970s was over. The period  can
howeverbe  considered  a period of transition, where many of the adjustments  were necessary for
the new economic  structure  of the next sub-oeriod.
III) 1986-1996:  Economic Boom, Speculation  and Bubble
In contrast with the previous period, the 1986-1996 can be considered the most
prosperous iime of Thai economy, if one is to pay attention  only on aggregate numbers.
The good time was most probably triggered by the external events. The first event was
the 1985 Plaza accords that had effectively realigned major currencies, where dollar began to
depreciate. Thai baht therefore depreciated likewise, as the U.S. dollar represented high weight in
the basket system. In fact, the government even tacitly increased  the U.S. dollar weight from
about half to 90 percentS,  to reap more benefits from this welcome  turn of event. The second
cxternal  factor was the sharp decrease  in petroleum products since 1986, which remained low
until the invasion of Kuwait by the Iraq in 1991.
Both accounts  on the external front greatly benefited Thai exports, especially the
manufactured ones. Weak currency together with reviving world economy from lowered oil
Sianrwala (200I, p.8).




















































prices accelerated the manufactured exports. Another important by-product  of the exchange rate
realignment was the re-location  of industrial productions from Japan, Taiwan and Hong Kong,
whose currencies  had been rising and needed to find netv locations that were more cost-effective.
Thus. invesrment capital in the form of FDI flooded into Thailand at an unprecedented magnitude.
The rnanufactured productions  surged in response to growing export and investment
demands. This was helped by the government's investment  policy put in place a few years back,
and also by the sluggish agriculrural production (which grew at only 0.4 and 0.1 percent in 1986
and 1987),'which released bulks of young and energetic unskilled labor suitable for light
industries.  The transition from agrarian economy  was thus completed.
political armosphere had also been inducing to high growth. The relatively stable
political  scene associated with Prem govemment  was followed by smooth transition to the
Chatchai government in 1988. Although the Chatchai government was thrown out in the 1990
coup, the new government led by Anand Panyarachun was did not have problem  getting
acceptance from the public. In fact, some viewed the 1990 coup with positive eyes, citing the
highly corrupt ministers and scandals in Chatchai go'/emment  as the justifiable pretext. Such
approval was short-lived,  when in 1992 the military top men attempted to have direct control of
the govemment, which led to another strong opposition  and board demonstration  among
urbalites9. When the military finally receded, all the govemments  since 1992 all gained their
power through parliamentary process. Although  each govemment did not stay in office very long,
one can'reasonably  concluded that Thailand  had moderate political stability between late 1992
and 1997.
Thailand was sufficiently fortunate that despite the tendency among politicians  and
rnilitary rulers to engage in big-scaled com:ption, the fiscal discipline remained largely intact
during this period. There are possible three reasons for this remarkable  achievement' First, the
hardship associated with tight fiscal policy in the first half of 1980s, which was the result of lax
9 Th.r. demonstrators  are sometimes called "mobile  phone mob", reflecting their general economic  status  as middle
and lrigher nriddle classes.88
fiscal policy during 1970s, was perhaps still a fresh memory.  Second, governments of the time
regarded tuming the fiscal budget into balance  and surplus a political achievement. Third, and
perhaps the most important,  reason  was that the foundation of budgetary process that was put in
place since early 1960s prevented systemic imprudent fiscal spendingl0
One interesting  thing worth nothing in this period is the shift in infrastructure  buildup
policy. Unlike in the 1960s when the governments were mainly and entirely responsible for
providing basic infrasfructure  (road, inigation) to the economy, the policy in 1980s and 1990s
was to give private companies  concessions to build, and sometimes operate, these infrastructures.
Telecommunications  and expressways stood out as good examples  of such policy. In principle,
the positive side ofthis policy is the reduced burden on public spending,  increased efficiency,  and
morc tirnely constructions.  Not all of these potentials were realized. The negotiations  between
public pcrsonals  and private companies often resulted in the marriage between the worst of both
worlds, namely, the inefficiency  and delays of the public sector and the greed of the private
sector. At any rate, the process has created  fortunes  for some of the private entrepreneurs.
While financial prudence in the public sector was evident, it was missing in private
sector. Speculation in real estate was taking place at an alarming rate, beginning  at around 1988
and ended possibly at 1991. The same phenomenon was observed in the stock market, where both
domestic and fbreign investors rushed in without proper analysis of risks involved. The
overoptimistic  views arising from the double-digit  gowth rates and the rapidly expanding
investment  opportunities eventually pushed up the SET index to sour more than twelve-fold
between  1985 and 1993, when the index topped at 1,682. The volume rose by more than a
hundred-fold during the same period. Although the bubble in the stock market lasted lonser than
that in the real estate market, it finally softened rapidly since 1994.
From the supply-side growth accounting, the major source of growth during this.period
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pcrccrlt of tlte contribution to growth during l99l-1995. There are however considerable
diff'erences of growth accounting between 1986-1990 and 1990-1gg5. The rapid capiral
accumulation of the earlier time of this sub-period was also accompanied  by an efficient use of
the accumulated capital. The contribution  of TFP growth was admirable at 31.3 pe.centll.  In
contrast, during the 1990-1995  the capital,  as well as other factors of production, were put to used
so inefficiently  by the speculation, suppressing the TFP growth, adjusted for changes in human
capital, to a mere 0.4 percent,
lY) 1997-2000: Structural  Crisis
The crisis of 1997 has been analyzed  extensively in various dimensions in the last few
years. In term of the origin or the causes  of the crisis, the following  factors have been mentioned:
o reduced competitiveness,  most obviously shown by the almost frozen export
growths in 1996,
a the maturity and cunency mismatches of the extemal debts,
' 
the failure of the Thai monetary authorities to review and adjust its exchange
policy in a timely fashion, incruding the overoptimistic view they took when
assessing the probability of successfully counter-attacking  the speculative attacks
on Thai baht during the first halfof 1997,
o the lax and inefficient supervision of financial institutions,  resulting in non-
transparent credit operations ofthe latter.
' 
What happened to economic growth after the crisis broke were more or less the
results of the responses to the crisis by the government  itself. The very tight
monetary  and fiscal policy stance, guided by the IMF, immediately adopted has
shrunk the economy to the point that, together with the ballooning debt burdens
' ' A part of this TFP growth  could come from higher yield on land used for agriculture.  See Section  4 fbr more
d iscussion.90
liom the rapid devaluation  of baht, the quality of most private companies' balance
sheets deteriorated  quickly and severely. This problem is reflected  most notably by
the figures of the non-performing  loans (NPLs)  appearing  on the asset side of the
commercial banks' financial balance sheets.
The subsequent lax fiscal policy, resulting from decreased  revenue projection rather than
deliberate public spending,  was only put in place in November 1998, more than one year after the
crisis began. This arguably helped the moderate ourput growth in 1999 and 2000.
If one were to perform growth accounting after the crisis, it would be found that the
drops of GDP in 1997 and 1998 were primarily conesponded  with lowered uses of capital stock
(capital utilization rates), and to a lesser extent the lowered uses of labor input (unemployment
and underemployment).  From demand  side, the shrinking investment demand  was the primary
downward force toward recession of 1997-1998.
The recovery in 1999 and 2000 has been on a shaky basis. The strong export growths
(especially in 2000), has worked its marvel among the backdrop of resumed stability in exchange
market and financial market. The situation in 2001 is considerably worse than 2000. Growth has
almost stagnated and unemployment  shows a rising trend again. Apart from the rapidly rising
unfavorable extemal development,  the internal  obstacles to higher growth was most likely the
rnalfunctioning  of financial market.  Banks have been, and still are, reluctant to lend to for the fear
of not getting back repayments  due mainly to the borrowers'  under-capitalized balance  sheet and
also to the still gloomy macroeconomic outlooks. Some big firms bypassed the banks by issuins
their own debt papers.
V) 2001-2005: Recovery to Normal
Since around 2001, Thai economy has shown a clear sign of steadily returning to its
normal growth performance. There are many factors conhibuting to this healthy recovery.  The
strong performance of the world economy, which recovered from IT bust in 2001, has
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exports. Financial institutions have also started lending again,
and excess liquidity.
1.3 Socio-Economic-politics  Explanation  of High Growth
While the discussions of factors explaining  growth in each
as to why such high growth take place in this country, one can
explanations relevant to Thailand's fifty year growth experiences.
proposed to be responsible  for the past ru.."rrl2.
9l
in spite of some debt hangovers
sub-period have implication
also draw a more general
The following factors are
Openness' The openness of Thai economy dates back to very early days. In the early
history, the international trades were limited to the hands of the royals and the government
officials' But the general public has participated in trades very actively as early as around 200
years ago' Thailand certainly benefits from its location advantage since it locates on many maJor
international trade paths, as well as its long borders,  both land and sea, with many neighboring
countries' The rulers, be they the monarchs  or the subsequent democratic governments,  always
encourage international  trades partly because of the taxes income generated from, or related  to.
trades.
Why trades are associated mainly with factor accumulation but not the improvement in
productivity needs further explanation. until recently, the intemational  trades of Thailand mostly
involve exploitation of natural resources, which are quite abundant when compared to many
countries  in the region. Simply commercializing  these natural resources with minimal processing,
all parties involved (the traders, the domestic middlemen,  the local producers, and the
governments) could make handsome  profits without the need to venture into uncertain
investments  aimed at increasing  productivity.
I I  i\"4,,r, ()t these cxplanations  are taken fiorn Sussangkarn  ( I 992).92
StabilitY
As demonstrated in the discussions of the growth explanation,  stability plays a very
irnportant role in promoting growth' Despite some intemlptions' Thailand has enjoyed a
reasonable degree of macroeconomic stability in many critical aspects during the most part of the
past five decades, namely, price stability,  exchange rate stability, and budget and current account
stability. The economic stability can be attributed to sound macroeconomic management  in both
fiscal and monetary policies. when faced with economic  difficulties that called for extraordinary
policy prudence,  Thai officials  could normally adopt and comply with the strenuously standards
and practices. one interesting aspect of Thai economy is its ability, at least until very recently' to
llore or less shield macroeconomic management from political  interventions'  Politicians  tended
to be passive when it comes to managing board macroeconomic  policies, letting the jobs to be in
the hands of technocrats. Also, many govemments  were weak, and primarily  played the role of
compromising  interest of many groups,leading  to peaceful continuation of economic development '
The stability in economic  climate gives the investors  strong incentive to accumulate
capitals. by reducing risk premia they would have to pay otherwise' Moreover, the continuation
of cleveloprnent strategy over the past several decades ensures the investors of the direction
Thailand is rnoving toward, making the decision to invest easier and less costly' In fact, as
Sussangkarn (lgg2) points out, the development path has been so continuous  that some critics
voice their concem over how difficult it is to change the course of development'
Human Quality
tsy no mean that Thailand can be on par with some other countries  like Japan' South
Korea, Taiwan ancl Singapore in term of success in developing human capital over the past few
dccades. However, there are sorne distinct features of Thai human quality that can explain the
accurnulation  process. These features include  the followings'
Good Basic Education. Thailand is among the countries in the region with the highest
literacy ratc. The basic education  seems to be helpful in traditional agriculture, and
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Thai workers is their ability to adapt and learn new basic skills, which make them
quite attractive  to potential investors'
Highty Educated Elites. On the other end, Thailand  also possesses a handful of highly
educated elites, who are trained in good universities or get educated  abroad. If
educated abroad, these people usually came back and serve the country as
government  officials, technocrats, entrepreneurs, and academics'
Female Labor. Thailand has very high female labor force participation rate. For
example,  the female labor force participation  in 1987 w:rs as high as 80 percent
which, as will be seen later in the section on regional comparison' is among the
highest in the region. These female workers are generally  preferred employees
of labor-intensive export industry'
Entrepreneurs. Thais in general have risk-taking characteristic,  which is a prerequisite
for being entrepreneurs.  Thai entrepreneurs range from the farmers themselves, who
take risks with every crops they plants, and those who engages in informal trades and
services  industries. This explains why social mobility in Thai society is quite high,
and many families have been able to escape poverty in the past decades.
Friendship
Thais are generally known to be friendly people' More importantly  perhaps, is the fact
that Thai people are tolerant, compromisinB, and prefer to avoid escalated conflicts whenever
possible. Very few have rigid dogmatic beliefs that can not be compromised. Obviously,  this
kind of attitude is conducive to assets accumulation because the fears for disruption  are
minirnized. Moreover,  Thailand also has a long history of friendship with foreigners, which is
true at all classes of Thai society. There is no hard feeling of being colonized, since Thailand
docs not have that experience. Ordinary Thais also welcome foreigners and usually  treat them
c0Lrallv.94
2. Pro-Poorness of Grorvth
ln this sectlon, we discuss  how economic growth in Thailand has helped the poverty
reduction. We trrst present the figures of poverfy incidences and income inequality and then
fbllowed by the estimates of the pro-poorness of growth'
2.1 PovertY and InequalitY
The high economic growth over 6 percent per annum on average ofthe past five decades
undoubtedly raised the well-being of the Thai population'  This can be very clearly demonstrated
by the substantial decline of the income poverty incidence (Table 7)' which reached its lowest
levelof14.8%(head-countratio)in1996from45o/oinearlylg60s,beforeincreasinglightlyto
2loh inthe year 2000 due to the economic  crisis. The latest poverty incidence in 2002 is l49oh

























Sourcc: .litsuclron and plangpraphan (2004).
Much less impressive is the distributional  aspects of the past growth experience.  With
only few interruptions, the income inequality in Thailand has been worsening overtime since the
1960s' The promotion of non-agricultural  manufacturing  industries (most notably through tax
incentives)  has widened  the gap of weil-being of rhai population.
Table 8 below shows the income share by household quintile between 19g6-2002.  It
clearly shows that the income disparity in Thailand has not improved at all. Income share of the
richest quintile was about l4 times of the poorest quintile.
Table 7 Poverty Incidence for l9g6-2002,  Consumption Approach
Region Area | 98( r988 1990 1992 r994 1996 1998 t999 200( 200 2AM
BMR
Municipal r5.c U.7 I r,9 a.+ 4.1 t.2 2.2 1.7 1.7 2.2
Total 15.0 ll l 1.9 4.4 4. I L.Z t.2 2.2 t.7 I 2.2
Central
Municipal 3r.c ,OC 10.8 9.( 5.4 A1 1A 7.0 4.t 5.0
Non-M unicipal 36.( JO.: 2't.8 2 r.8 t2.2 6.5 9.4 10.5 10. i 8.0 9.0
Total 34.C 34.5 zo. I 18.3 |.2 b. I 7.8 9.4 9.0 6.9 7.6
North
Municipal J)_  I 39.2 27.8 19. I 19. I t J.q r 4.l t2.1 l6. t 18.3 I 3.5
Non-Municipal 48.7 50. I JI.I 36.3 2t.2 | 9.( 17. I 20.i z4.t 21.1 22.1
Total 46.C 47.9 35.2 JZ. I 20.8 l7.t 16.5 19.( zJ-| 20.5 20.3
Northeast
Municipal Jt..l 32.4 3l. r 24.6 t 5.4 r 5.( 17.2 18.7 1n r r8.8 I 1.9
Non-Municipal 66.5 60.( 48.7 44.1 30.4 26.3 JJ.J 39.C 38.4 50. I 25.(
Total 62.i s6.7 46.1 4l.l 28.1 24.5 30.7 35.7 35.3 33.4 23.1
South
Municipal lo./ t7.6 18.6 l l.8 10.6 11 o./ 9.4 5.i 7.2 4.4
Non-Municipal 42.6 36.'l Jt.t 28.7 19.8 n.2 l6.l t7.4 t9.t 15. ll')
l'otal J /.J 32.5 29.( 25.2 r 7.8 l0.3 14.0 15.( t6.6 r 3.3 9.6
Whole
Kingdom
Municipal )\1 23.1 20.5 L2.l 9.9 6.8 7.1 8.5 8.6 d.: 6.4
Non-Municipal 52.( 49.1 39.2 35.: 22.9 18.2 ')) ( 25.6 26.5 23.( 18.9
Total 44.9 42.2 JJ. I 28.4 19.0 14.8 t7.5 20.4 21.0 18.8 t4.91986 1988 r990 1992 1994 r996 1998 2000 20t2
Quintile I 4.53 4.57 4.31 3.98 4.04
A  1a
a.  tL 4.24 3.88 4.1',7
Quintile 2 7.89 8.03 1<A 7.06 7.33 7.47 7.67 7.18 7.63
Quintile 3 12.36 12.35 I1.69 I 1.08 1 1.68 tr.76 I 1.93 tt.42 I 1.96
Quintile 4 20.37 20.57 t9.46 18.78 t9.72 19.93 19.84 19.89 20.05
Quintile  5 54.84 54,47 57.00 59.09 5',t.23 56.73 56.31 57.63 56.19
Total 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 r00.00 100.00
96
Table 8 Househoid Income Share by Quintile, 1986-2002
SoLrrce: Socio-Economic  Surveys, National Statistical Offrce, Thailand
Almost all inequality  measures confirm the worsening trend of income distribution
ploblern, as shown in Table 9. For example, the Gini index rose from 0.496 in 1986 to 0.510 in
2002.
Table 9 Various Indicators of Income Distribution
Note :  GINI: Gini index, VL: variance of log-income
GE(0): Generalised Entropy degree 0 or Shorrocks' index degree 0
GE(l): Generalised Entropy degree I or Theil's index
GE(2): Generalised Entropy degree 2
AE2: Atkinson's index degree 2 (inequality aversion parameter - 2)
AE3: Atkinson's index degree 3 (inequality aversion parameter:  3)










Year GINI VL GE(0) GE(l) GE(2) AEz AE3
1986 0.4958 0.7311 0.4226 0.4949 r.r775 0.5271 0.6445
1988 0.4886 0.7367 0.4088 0.4459 0.7816 0.5220 0.63s9
l 990 0.5146 0.77 43 0.4564 0.5459 r.5744 0.5485 0.6560
1992 0.5363 0.8174 0.4998 0.5941 1.8002 0.5780 0.6835
1994 0.5209 0.8056 0.4722 0.5499 1.4478 0.5652 0.6772
r996 0.5158 0.7839 0.4624 0.5335 t.2768 0.5592 0.6690
1998 0.5090 0.8546 0.4477 0.5084 L0893 0.5484 0.6593
2000 c.5249 0.7974 0.4827 0.5315 r.0851 0.5790 0.6896
2002 0.5103 0.8912 0.4525 0.5189 1.2154 0.5541 0.66102000 2042
3.88 +.t  I
7. l8 7.63










2.2 Pro-Poor Growth Estimates
Here, we apply the method developed in Kakwani et'al (2004) in estimating the rate of
pro-poor growth for Thailand.
Following Kakwani  et'al (2004), for any poverry  indicator  d '
0 - 0 (2, lt, L(P))
we may estimate the poverty  equivalent  growth rate by:
f-=(6trt)r,
where f  is the growth rate of mean welfare' defined  as
y = Ln(tt)- Ln(P')
und 6 i. total Poverty elasticitY,
I = Qnl0(2,14,L2(p))l-  Lnl0(2, n,l"(p)l) I i
and nthe estimate of growth elasticity of poverty
I
,t =)tUqz,h,\@)))- Ldilz, A,t"(p\)+ Mpr, n,l"(p)))- udilt, tt ,I"(p)))ll ,'
L
Similar to Kakwani et.al (2004), we use the ratio of per capita consumption expenditure
to per capital poverty line as the welfare measure for the estimation  of pro-poor growth' Table l0
presents the welfare level, the head-count ratios, the poverty gap, the poverty severity, and Watts
index for the year 1986-2002.  The welfare level dropped during 1996-2000 as the rcsult of










tl il 0.6670Table l0 Poverty Measures, 1986'2002




1986 139. I 44.7 r 3.l 5.3 t7.2
988 148.6 4t.9 I 1.3 4.3 14,5
990 t68.9 J3.1 8.1 2.8 10.1
992 r 85.9 28.4 6.6 2.2 8.2
994 20'1.6 19.0 3.9 t.2 4.8
996 223.1 14.8 2.9 0.9 J..t
998 204.4 17.5' 3.3 t.0 4.0
999 za3.r 20.3 4.3 1.3 5.2
2000 199.0 21.0 '4.2 1.3 5.1
200r 204.6 r 8.8 3.1 l.l 4.5
2002 225.0 ,rrir3S 2,4 0.7. 2.9
Source:  Author's calculation.  ,  . .r
Table l l gives the estimates of the poverfy equivalent  growth rates (PEGR) during 1986-
2002. Growth is said to be pro-poor  when the poverty equivaldnt growth rates are higher than the
actuat growrh rares. w,ll lpirlTte'lgqr 
wf i:,aF r9.,tt F:,peri9d,$ufng 
the economic boom
(1986-1996), pBCn.foi 
1he lguJ tndicel wgre ggnerally yery clgse to the actual growth rates,
meaning that both the'poor and'the non?oor were benefiting from growth more or less equally'
However, when breaking into sud-peribd  withirl this goliten decade,  we can see that not until the
year l992that the poor began to catch up with the non-poor in the growth process. The growths
in the enset of thbrcdnorniqboom,(1986-1992)  were pqstly dominated  by the.non-poor.
: ,The pto?oomes5,pfrg.owth  during the economic crisis is interesting' During the first
crisis year (1998, compared,to.,1996)  the poorrwere not hit as hard as the non-poor were, likely
because of the commodity  price boom in 1998 prevented the poor, especially those in agricultural
sector, from suffering  tdo niuch).from  the economic Crisis. However' one year later (1993-1999)
when the irnpacts of the crisis were strongest, and after the commodity  prices leveled off, the poor
were suffering more. The recovery time, starting from 2000, is a mixed picture  as the PEGR of
poverty gap, severify, and Watts, show the pro-poorness, but that of the head-count  ratio is only
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The PEGR for the entire period of 1986-2002 are roughly the same as the actual growth
ratcs, indicating  a somewhat reassuring pro-poor performance  of the overall growth process of
Thailand.
Table ll  Poverty Equivalent Growth Rates, 1986'2002
Note: The figures here are not the same as those estimates  by Kakwani  et. at. (2004)  for Thailand.  This is because the
poverty lines used here are generally higher.
Source:  Author's calculation.
2.3 Poverty Elasticity with Respect to Income Components and Poverty Reform Index
Knowing whether any growth episode is pro-poor does not immediately lead to any
policy recommendation.  Here we present the estimates of poverty elasticity with respect  to
incomc cotnponents and the estimates of poverfy reform index, following Kakwani (2001).
Poverty elasticity with respect to income components

































200t-2002 9.5 9.2 9.9 9.9 9.8 * * :a
2000-2001 2.8 3.2 3.4 3.1 3.3 t * ,; I
999-2000 -2.1 1.4 0.3 0.6 0.3 * * :l rl
998- 999 -0.7 -4.8 -6.s -6.6 -6.4
996- 998 -4.4 -2,5 1.9 -1.6 - 1.8
,l * * I
994- 996 3.6 4.0 3.9 3.9 3.9
rl I * !t
992- 994 5.5 7.4 7.2 7.1 7.2 * |i t t
990- 992 4.8 3.7 3.1 3.1 3.1
988- 990 6.4 5.4 5.7 5.8 5.7
986- 988 3.3 1.8 2.9 3.3 3.1 *
1986-1996 4.7 4.6 4.7 4.8 4.7 I *
1996-2000 -2.9 -2.7 -2.4 -2.3 -2.4 * I * t
2000-2002 6.1 6.5 6.6 6.5 6.5 |l I * I
t986-2002 3.0 3.1 3.2 3.2 3.2
rt rt * *r00









When a * 0.
Poverly elasticity  tells how many percentage  of poverty reduction would be gained if the
,th l  lnco[te component  increases by one percent.
Poverty  reform index (PRI)
Poverty reform index for i'n income component is defined as





L  4 e, = 4 o
The PRI has the properfy  of summing  up to unity,
I siQ,=l
S' is the proportion of ith income in the total income.
If any income component  has the PRI greater than one, then that income component  has
stronger  impact in reducing poverty, since it helps reducing inequality in the total income.  The
PRI can thus help guide the policy by determining which income components should  be promoted
and which should not be.
Table l2 and l3 present the poverty elasticity  and poverry reform index for head-count
ratio and poverty gap, for the year 2000. Poverfy elasticity (head-count ratio) for the whole









would reduce by 1.206 percent. Non-municipal (rural) areas contribute  more to the poverfy
elasticity than the municipal  (urban)  areas, simply because most poor persons lived in rural areas.
A surprising resutt is the high value of poverty elasticity of in-kind income in the rural area (-
0.627), indicating its importance  in helping the poor escape poverty'
be gained if the  poverty reform index is also higher in rural area. Non-farm  profits are most crucial for
poverry reduction in rural areas, while wage and salary and farm profits are most crucial in the
urban areas.
Table 12 Poverty Elasticity and Poverty Reform Index (Ilead-Count Ratio),
by Sources of Income
Sources of Income







Wage and Salary -0.2t6 -0.016 -0.232 0.978 0.028 0.885
Non-Farm  Profits -0.035 -0.007 -0.042 r.049 0.023 0.635
Farm Profits -0.202 -0.003 -0.205 r.016 0.027 1.087
Pension -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 0.374 0.006 0.273
Government  Assistance -0.083 -0.002 -0.085 t.024 0.019 0.991
Agriculrure Rent -0.001 -0.000 -0.001 0.816 0.019 0.845
Non-Agricultural Rent -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 0.0r I 0.091
Iuterest and Dividend -0.001 -0.000 -0.001 t.022 0.018 0.98s
In-kind Income -0.627 -0.013 -0.639 1.027 0.024 L065
Total Income l.165 -0.041 1.206 1.016 0.025 1.000
Source:  Calculated from 2000 Socio-Economic  Surveys,  National Statistical Oflice, Thailand
for head-count



































Wage and Salary -0.415 -0.046 -0.460 1.019 0.043 0.953
Non-Farm  Profits -0.061 -0.019 -0.081 L005 0.034 0.665
Farm Profits -0.371 '0.006 -0.377 1.012 0.429 1.084
Pension -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 0.358 0.011 0.278
Government  Assistance -0.148 -0.006 -0.154 0.995 0.027 0.975
Agriculture  Rent -0.001 -0.000 -0.001 0.548 0.01s 0.570
Non-Agricultural  Rent -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 0.009 0.074
Interest and Dividend -0.002 -0.000 -0.002 
, 0.918 0.024 0.897
In-kind Income I 113 -0.030 1.143 0.993 0.031 1.036
Total Income -2.110 -0.107 -2.2t7 1.001 0.035 L000
Slurce: Calculated from 2000 Socio-Economic  Suweys, National  Statistical Office, Thailand103
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